Industrial sickness has reached alarming proportions in India. In 1980, there were nearly 24,000 units that were sick, that is, were defaulting on repayments of loans to banks, leaving Rs. 18 billion (1,800 crore) of bank finance in geography (10) . Over 400 large, 1,000 medium scale, and 22,000 small scale units were sick, many in the employment intensive traditional industries like textiles, sugar, and jute. Statewise, Maharashtra and West Bengal had the most sick units. The threat to employment, and to the business of suppliers to the sick units was serious, and closures could trigger a chain reaction that could plunge the economy into a recession. The management of turnaround is still poorly understood. A study of 9 Indian case studies prompted Khandwalla to suggest a model of effective turnaround (9) . Its chief characteristics were a credible change agent; mobilization of the organization's rank-and-file; priority to quick pay-off projects; negotiation of temporary reprieve from pressure groups in the environment; seizing of opportunities offered by the -environment; selective changes in the organization's product mix; selective strengthening of management systems; motivation of staff through giving them challenging tasks, participative decision-making; operating autonomy coupled with accountability for performance; peer group pressure for excellence; and example set by the change agent; coordination through performance review meetings, coordination committees, direct face-toface settlement of conflicts; setting up There may, however, be no one model of effective turnaround. For, actions that are sensible in one culture, such as ready firing of staff, may be infeasible in another culture in which legislation prohibits or sharply restricts such lay offs. Similarly, divestiture and diversification, relatively easy in some societies, may, for a host of reasons, including import restrictions and anti-monopoly legislation, be infeasible in others. Also, turnaround strategies are likely to be strongly influenced by the causes of sickness : if sickness has been due to stagnation in the firm's industry, diversification may be the cornerstone of a turnaround strategy; if mismanagement has been the cause, its change and revitalization may be the cornerstone. Thus a search for alternative, more situation specific models of effective turnaround is highly desirable. For this purpose, 18 cases of turnaround, published in British and American business magazines, were analysed. As can be seen from Table 1 , these cases cover a wide spectrum of industries ranging across consumer goods (cosmetics, blades, watches, entertainment products, cars, etc.), producer goods 'steel, chemicals, oil), equipment (computer nardware, office equipment) and services (airline, data processing). Cases are drawn not only from the U. S. and Britain but also from Japan and European countries.
Those cases were included in the sample that were reasonably completely described. There may be many omissions and commissions in the published cases, since these were written by journalists rather than scholars, and journalists often highlight-or even inventthe dramatic, and gloss over what to them appears mundane or uninteresting. For the purposes of this paper, sickness was defined as a decline in performance (not necessarily a loss making situation), and turnaround as dramatic performance improvement (not necessarily a profit-earning situation) (17) .
Analysis of causes of sickness
As far as sickness is concerned, data on contributory causes have been analysed (Table 2) under the heads of 1) root cause; 2) external cause; 3) general management (inappropriate structure, strategy or style); 4) finance and control; 5) R & D; 6) operations; and 7) personnel. For instance, Bullova, the famous maker of watches, made a loss of 25 million dollars in 1976. The root cause of 'sickness appeared to be a dogmatic, authoritarian CEO who was obsessed with the expansion mania and failed to recognize environmental changes. He led the company to blind expansion in 127 countries without prior market studies with an obsolete product that faced stiff competition. Financial assessment of the profitability of Bullova's revenue and cost control was poor. The company had neglected R & D and hence had not developed new products. There was widespread staff resentment against the CEO.
An examination of Table 2 , especially the root cause column, indicated that, in the majority of cases, sickness was caused mainly by inappropriate management. Either it was too centralized or autocratic, as at Bullova, or too conservative and non-innovative, as at NCR and Olivetti, or too conservative and seat-of the-pants, as at Carey and British Leyland, or too bureaucratic as at BEA, or foolhardily risk taking, as at Litton. Even when external causes for sickness were operating, management shortcomings may have aggravated these crises. Besides the style of management, inappropriate or excessive diversifications were also root causes of sickness in several cases. At Searle, EMI, and Litton, sickness appeared to be due to excessive diversification and the attendant loss of management control. At ARBED, British Steel, and Bullova, on the other hand, excessive dependence on a single vulnerable product was a major cause of sickness. In several cases, growth mania was a major cause of sickness, as at Bullova, EMI, and Litton. In at least one case, (NCR), management complacency begotten by mono- Figure 1 summarizes the major models of sickness that emerge from the case studies.
Turnaround strategies
The turnaround action of 18 companies is summarized in Table 3 . Table 4 provides an analysis of turnaround mechanisms. Several points emerge from Tables 3 and 4. 1. In the majority of the cases, the turn around agent or team was a newcomer to the corporation. This accords with the Indian experience of turnaround (9).
2. In several cases, notably of American Safety Razors, EMI, BEA, and Toyo Kogyo, the turnaround was effected by a team rather than by an individual.
3. In many companies, heavy lay offs were effected to trim the fat. This happened at Burroughs where 4,000 were fired as also at NCR (17,000), Fiat (23,000), British Leyland (5,000), Searle (500), Toyo Kogyo (10,000), Helena Rubenstein, British Steel, and Olivetti. This kind of massive lay off is much less experienced in India, where courts can be moved to restrain it. The ability to fire people freely may imply much less emphasis on staff motivation strategies. Nurturance seemed much less in evidence in Western turnaround cases than in Indian cases (9).
4. Rapid shuffling of product/plant port folios was another feature of Western turn around cases. Many products were given up or plants were sold off or closed at Bullova, Arkala Gas, Burroughs, Litton, Helena Rubenstein, Autobar, and Searle. In fact, the ease with which corporations can diversify (as compared to India where many governmental hurdles have to be crossed for diversification) also may make for much careless diversifica tion which then becomes an albatross round the company's neck. Thus it is that divestiture is a much more common turnaround mecha nism in the West as compared to India (9) .
Equally, several companies introduced new products. Bullova and Helena Rubenstein extended the product lines they retained; NCR entered into integrated computer systems; ARBED integrated forward steel using products; BEA diversified into hotels; Autobar, Olivetti, and Searle introduced new products. These diversifications were much more selective and careful, following a period of hectic diversification and growth mania. The diversification was usually of the related kind, or if occasionally unrelated, it was ventured into with much more care than before. In India too, turnaround cases exhibited a tendency towards selective related diversification, although possibly on a smaller scale due to government restrictions.
5. There was much evidence of technolo gical cranking up through either greater or more focussed R & D effort. R & D was refocussed and/or enlarged at Bullova, Burroughs, NCR, Litton, Olivetti, Searle, and Toyo Kogyo. This kind of greater selectivity and/or greater emphasis on R & D was largely missing in the Indian turnaround cases (9) . In India, in any case, very few companies engage in R & D.
6. Selective strengthening of management systems was often encountered in these organizations. Burroughs, BEA, and British Leyland, for example, added critical departments like planning and MIS; NCR established more cost and profit centres; Fiat introduced more professional management and cost centres; Litton emphasized planning more than before; at Autobar a formal management control system was installed. In strengthening the systems there was greater emphasis on planning and control functions than before. At the same time, in several companies, there was greater decentralization, as at Bullova, Fiat, ARBED, BEA, British Leyland, Autobar, and Olivetti. There was thus evidence of a movement towards both greater centralized control (of an impersonal kind as represented by a performance reporting system) and operating decentralization, an arrangement that afforded initiative to the managerial rank-andfile without loss of accountability. In India, too, this tendency was visible (9) . Occasionally, in the Western cases, one encountered centralization of decision-making, as at the excessively diversified Litton. But here too, while decision-making was centralized, it was done in a committee of executives, not in a single individual. 7. In many enterprises there was a stronger commercial orientation in the marketing function, and greater profitability orientation in the production function. In other words, in enterprises, greater profitability became the watchword for most operations. Goals like growth, empire building, and so forth declined in their importance relative to profitability. Thus, the turnaround strategies followed in the West have several points of resemblance to Indian turnarounds, but there are also interesting differences. As in India, the change agent was mostly an outsider; there was selective strengthening of management systems; a rearrangement of the product portfolio; greater emphasis on profitability; greater decentralization but also simultaneous increase in accountability. Unlike in India, however, mass lay offs and use of terror were far more frequent in the West, and there was much less emphasis on intrinsic motivators, mobilization of the rankand-file, and modes of integrating them into a team through participative decision-making. The element of nurturance seemed much stronger in India. The range of product reshuffling appeared much greater in the West, as also the emphasis on enlarging and/or on refocussing of R & D. The model of turnaround process that emerges from Western cases is shown in Figure 2 . By and large it is consistent with the findings of Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (17) , based on their study of 54 American companies, that turnarounds are characterized by changes at the level of general management, more R & D and the introduction of new products; construction of new plant or expansion of the existing plant; diversification; attempts of new efficiency through such means as cost cutting programmes, new budgeting and cost control systems, and plant modernization; and divestiture.
Turnaround strategies and causes of sickness
The linkages between causes of sickness and the use of mechanisms of turnaround are shown in Table 5 . For each cause of sickness, a number of turnaround actions, some organizational in character (such as change in top 
